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ABSTRACT
Previous research has provided contradictory findings 
regarding the determinants of criminal court sentencing.
This study discusses the applicability of status 
characteristics theory to the study of sentencing outcomes 
and examines the determinants of sentencing in Michigan.
Status characteristics theory, as proposed by Unnever 
and Hembroff, argues that judges form expectations regarding 
criminal defendants based upon diffuse status and 
performance characteristics. Examples of diffuse status 
characteristics are age, gender, and race. Performance 
characteristics include offense severity and prior criminal 
record. In attempting to apply this theory to the study of 
sentencing outcomes, two problems are identified. The first 
problem revolves around the method by which judges either 
combine or balance expectations in situations having 
numerous diffuse status and performance characteristics.
The second problem concerns the lack of operationalized 
definitions for key terms employed in the theory. The 
author concludes that status characteristics theory, at its 
present stage of development, cannot be applied validly or 
reliably to judicial decision making processes.
Focusing on whether legally prescribed variables, 
nonprescribed variables, statutory maximum, or a combination 
thereof provide the best prediction of sentence length, the 
present study examines assault and robbery cases adjudicated 
in Michigan. The analyses reveal that statutory maximum is 
the single best predictor for assault cases; legally 
prescribed variables provide the best prediction of sentence 
length for robbery cases. The author presents possible 
interpretations of these results and discusses their 
relevance for future research.
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DETERMINANTS OF CRIMINAL COURT SENTENCING
Chapter I
Introduction and History of Sentencing Research/ 
Sentencing Guidelines
Introduction
Questions of bias in the handling of adult 
criminal offenders have led to numerous studies and 
commentaries on sentencing decisions. Much of this 
research has focused on the power of such variables as 
race, age, gender, and social class to predict 
sentencing outcomes. Such variables, often called 
extra-legal variables, are examined in light of the 
assertion that the United States court system is based 
upon a legal model wherein defendants should be treated 
equally, regardless of race, class, or position.
In the 1970s, a corresponding concern with 
disparity in sentencing practices prompted the 
emergence of a determinate sentencing reform movement 
within the judicial branch. Numerous state 
jurisdictions and the federal judicial system 
implemented sentencing guidelines, one form of 
determinate sentencing, in an attempt to decrease
2
3judicial discretion and lessen sentence discrepancies. 
In the current study, I examine the history of 
sentencing research and sentencing guidelines. Within 
this context, I critique status characteristics theory, 
as proposed by Unnever and Hembroff, and examine the 
determinants of sentencing in Michigan, a state 
employing felony sentencing guidelines.
History of Sentencing Research
After nearly a decade of research on sentencing, 
findings regarding the effects of legal and extra-legal 
variables are varied and contradictory. Reasons 
offered for these discrepant findings include 
methodological problems such as the use of inconsistent 
measures of sentence severity, sampling errors, lack of 
controls for legally relevant variables, 
ungeneralizability due to emphasis on single 
jurisdiction studies, and specification errors due to 
focusing on main effects versus indirect effects of 
extra-legal variables (Hagan and Bumiller 1983; Nagel 
and Geraci 1983; Zatz 1987), along with debate over the 
definition and germaneness of "legal" and "extra-legal" 
variables (Hagan 1974; Horwitz and Wasserman 1980) .
4In addition, while a variety of theories and 
perspectives have been propounded to explain the 
effects of legal and extra-legal variables, no 
governing theory has emerged (Hagan and Bumiller 1983) . 
Some of the competing theories used to examine 
sentencing include conflict and labeling theory 
(Chambliss and Seidman 1971; Chiricos and Waldo 197 5; 
Bernstein, Kick, Leung, and Schulz 1977; Jacobs 197 8; 
Unnever, Frazier, and Henretta 1980; Kempf and Austin 
1986; D'Alessio and Stolzenber 1993), social control 
theory (Kruttschnitt 1980-81, 1984; Kruttschnitt and 
Green 1984; Daly 1987a, 1987b, 1989), status 
characteristics theory (Unnever and Hembroff 1988), the 
liberation hypothesis (Spohn and Cederblom 1991), the 
Gestalt model (Maynard 1982), functionalism or the 
legalistic perspective (Lotz and Hewitt 1977), and the 
preferential treatment argument (Moulds 197 8; Curran 
1983; Gruhl, Welch, and Spohn 1984). Little or no 
theoretical basis supports other research (Clarke and 
Koch 1977; Thomson and Zingraff 1981; Rich, Sutton, 
Clear, and Saks 1982; Greenwood, Abrahamse, and Zimring 
1984; Petersilia 1984; Petersilia and Turner 1985; 
Dailey 1993).
5While much of the post-1960s research controls for 
legal variables such as offense seriousness and prior 
record, the focus continues to be on possible disparity 
caused by extra-legal variables. The principal extra- 
legal variables examined have been race, gender, socio­
economic status, and age.
Numerous authors have found significant direct and 
indirect discriminatory race effects in the adult 
criminal justice system (Wolfgang and Riedel 1973 ; 
Unnever, Frazier, and Henretta 1980; Thomson and 
Zingraff 1981; Kruttschnitt 1984; Petersilia 1984; 
Petersilia and Turner 1985; Kempf and Austin 1986;
Myers 1987; Unnever and Hembroff 1988; Nelson 1992); 
however, similar studies have found little or no effect 
(Hagan 1974; Chiricos and Waldo 197 5; Clarke and Koch 
197 6; Bernstein, Kelly, and Doyle 1977; Lotz and Hewitt 
1977; Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Striefel 1993). In 
addition, some studies have found that race affects 
sentencing decisions only in certain types of cases 
(Clarke and Koch 1977; Spohn and Cederblom 1991) or in 
certain jurisdictions (Rich, Sutton, Clear, and Saks
1982). Other studies have shown that Caucasian 
defendants receive harsher sentences than African- 
American defendants. Nagel and Geraci (1983) examined
6judicial sentencing decisions of adult assault and 
larceny cases. They found that Caucasians received 
more severe sentences than African-Americans.
Anderson (1976), Moulds (1978), Steffensmeier 
(1980), Curran (1983), Visher (1983), Kruttschnitt 
(1984), Gruhl, Welch, and Spohn (1984), Carres (1986), 
Daly (1987a, 1987b, 1989), and Abrams and Greaney 
(1989) reported that women tend to receive more lenient 
dispositions than their male counterparts; however, 
Hagan (1974) and Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel 
(1993) did not find any significant gender effects.
Some researchers note that only certain types of women 
receive preferential treatment (Anderson 197 6;
Steffensmeier 1980; Kruttschnitt 1980-81; Visher 1983; 
Chesney-Lind 1987; Daly 1989). These researchers argue 
that female defendants who deviate from stereotypic 
gender expectations do not receive preferential 
treatment, but rather, receive sanctions similar to 
those of males.
Regarding measures of socio-economic status, some 
researchers have found a significant negative relation 
(Clarke and Koch 197 6; Croyle 1983; Kruttschnitt 1984; 
D'Allesio and Stolzenberg 1993), while others have not 
(Chiricos and Waldo 197 5; Unnever 1982) .
7Clarke and Koch (197 6) did not find an age effect 
in their examination of burglary and larceny cases. 
Unnever, Frazier, and Henretta (1980), Greenwood, 
Abrahamse, and Zimring (1984), and Steffensmeier, 
Kramer, and Streifel (1993) did report a significant 
age effect on sentencing outcomes.
History of Sentencing Guidelines
Indeterminate sentencing is grounded upon the 
assumption that offenders can be rehabilitated into 
non-offenders. Under this sentencing model, the actual 
term of imprisonment for an offender is determined by a 
parole authority (Goodstein and Hepburn, 1985).
The 197 0s saw a growing dissatisfaction with the 
use of indeterminate sentencing, which had been the 
prevailing sentencing policy for over a century.
Concern about sentencing disparity and possible 
discrimination, a desire for increased accountability, 
and a disillusionment with the rehabilitation model are 
but a few of the reasons identified for this 
dissatisfaction (Rich, Sutton, Clear, and Saks 1982; 
Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983; Goodstein and 
Hepburn 1985; Petersilia and Turner 1985; Moore and
8Miethe 1986; Myers 1993). In addition, although social 
science research cannot be identified as the driving 
force behind indeterminate sentencing1s fall from 
favor, it did provide support for the impression of 
widespread discrimination in sentencing (Blumstein, 
Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983) .
The criticism of indeterminate sentencing led to a 
reform movement that focused on determinate sentencing. 
Reform innovations instituted under this model include 
the use of guidelines for plea bargaining, parole, and 
sentencing; the abolition of plea bargaining and 
parole; statutory determinate sentencing; and mandatory 
minimum sentencing (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 
1983) .
Sentencing guidelines are formal classification 
instruments, which are usually based upon some 
statistical average of past judicial sentencing 
behavior. Most states use a matrix format that weights 
various offender and offense criteria. Intersecting 
the offender and offense criteria scores locates an 
offender's overall summary score, which then identifies 
the appropriate sentencing range. Mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances often are used to adjust an 
offender's overall summary score, and judges usually
9are allowed to depart completely * from a guideline 
sentencing range under certain circumstances.
Since the first guidelines were instituted in 
Minnesota in 1980, there have been few independent 
studies conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
state sentencing guidelines (Tonry 1987). Those that 
have been done usually report that sentencing 
guidelines have not increased sentence uniformity, 
generally, (Carrow 1984; Knapp 1984; D'Allessio and 
Stolzenberg 1993) nor have they eliminated race effects « 
(Rich, Sutton, Clear, and Saks 1982; Cohen and Tonry 
1983), socio-economic status effects (Cohen and Tonry
1983), or gender effects (Rich, Sutton, Clear, and Saks 
1983>) , specifically. A few reported tentative 
confirmation that sentencing guidelines, especially 
those that are presumptive in nature, increase 
uniformity (Moore and Miethe 1986; Tonry 1988).
Chapter II 
Status Characteristics Theory
Theoretical Background
Finding the sentencing literature deficient in 
theoretical explanation, I originally sought to 
examine basic propositions of status characteristics 
theory as applied to criminal court sentencing in 
Michigan. In particular, I sought to examine the 
variant of status characteristics theory proposed by 
Unnever and Hembroff in their 1988 research.
Status characteristics theory is one of the 
major branches of a larger theoretical body known as 
expectation states theory. Focusing primarily on 
patterns of interaction among small groups and authored 
by Joseph Berger and his associates (see Berger, Cohen, 
and Zelditch 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 
1977; Ridgeway, Berger, and Smith 1985), status 
characteristics theory argues that in collective task 
situations, individuals develop expectations of each 
others' abilities to contribute to task success through
i *the evaluation of various status characteristics.
10
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Unnever and Hembroff (1988) were the first authors 
to relate the basic propositions of status 
characteristics theory to the process of judicial 
decision making. They posit that "actors [i.e., 
judges] form expectations for what individuals [i.e., 
defendants] deserve or how competent they are based on 
the individuals' ranks on social characteristics. In 
general, actors associate having a high or desirable 
rank on a characteristic with deserving the more 
desirable type of sanction available" (p.57).
Two types of social characteristics are identified 
by Unnever and Hembroff: diffuse status
characteristics and performance characteristics. 
"Diffuse status characteristics represent membership 
categories where the qualities attributed to members 
generally are assumed to be true of each particular 
member even though specific abilities or 
predispositions in a particular member have not been 
demonstrated" (p.58). Examples of diffuse status 
characteristics are age, gender, and race. Variables 
identified as performance characteristics combine to 
compose a performance characteristic set. A 
performance characteristic set is "a collection of 
interrelated specific abilities, behaviors,
12
dispositions, or task characteristics. Each element in 
the set has differentially evaluated states (i.e, one 
rank is preferred over the other) and different 
expectations for sanctions or future behaviors 
associated with each rank" (p.58). A performance 
characteristic set consists of such variables as prior 
criminal record and seriousness of offense.
Acknowledging that judicial decision making is not 
a collective task situation, Unnever and Hembroff 
(1988) argue, nevertheless, that status characteristics 
theory can be used to explain when sentencing 
disparities are "more likely to occur" (p.57).
Critique of Theory
In attempting to apply status characteristics 
theory to my research database, two problems emerged 
which made the application impossible. The first 
problem revolves around the method by which judges 
either combine or balance expectations in situations 
having numerous diffuse status and performance 
characteristics. That is, how do judges arrive at an 
overall expectation state when the defendant is high in 
status on some variables and low in status on others?
13
The second problem concerns the lack of operationalized 
definitions for key terms employed in the theory.
The literature on status characteristics theory is 
filled with debate concerning the method by which 
expectation states are determined in situations where 
more than one status characteristic is differentially 
evaluated. Hembroff (1982) suggests that individuals 
balance and combine status ranks depending on the 
circumstances:
. . .suppose that each actor's rank on P is 
discrepant with his/her rank on D. This is the 
case we identify as status inconsistency. If P 
were similar to the instrumental task ability... 
while D were not...then the actors could safely 
ignore their respective ranks on D. If P were 
totally dissimilar to the instrumental task 
ability...while D were not...then the actors could 
safely ignore their ranks on P. These would 
constitute conditions where the balancing of 
inconsistency occurs. But if neither P nor D is 
totally similar or totally dissimilar to the task 
ability, then ignoring one would be throwing away 
potentially relevant information and would 
increase the risk of an extreme error. Therefore, 
the discrepant ranks will be combined under these 
conditions. Furthermore, to equally weight 
characteristics which differ in their degrees of 
dissimilarity to the task ability also would be 
irrational. Therefore, it is assumed that actors 
combine ranks weighted acccording to the degree of 
dissimilarity of the characteristic to that of the 
task. The weighted strength of the less 
dissimilar characteristic becomes the principal 
basis for forming expectations about the relative 
probabilities for self and other. The strength of 
the discrepant, more dissimilar characteristic
14
tempers the expectation" (p.188, italics in the 
original, where P=performance set and D=diffuse 
status characteristic).
In their 1988 research, Unnever and Hembroff 
propose that variables affecting judicial decision 
making are both nonlinear and nonadditive. They argue 
that when the elements making up a performance set are 
consistent with each other, diffuse characteristics 
will have no effect. As the degree of inconsistency in 
the performance set increases, the effects of diffuse 
characteristics increases. When the performance set 
holds elements totally inconsistent with each other, 
the rank of the diffuse status characteristics will 
decide the interactions. That is, there is "a 
curvilinear relationship between the degree of 
inconsistency in the performance set and the effect of 
the diffuse status characteristic on the [judge's] 
decision" (p.61).
Further confusing the issue of measurement are the 
lack of operationalized definitions for key terms 
related to this theory. Regarding a definition for 
similarity/dissimilarity, Hembroff (1982) states that:
"[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of one set of 
elements to another is defined as being determined 
by whether any of the elements of the first set 
has been excluded from symmetrical relations with 
the elements of the second set; or whether any of
15
those of the first set has been excluded from 
having the same state of evaluation as those of 
the second...if one characteristic were comprised 
of consistently evaluated elements while another 
characteristic were comprised of inconsistently 
evaluated elements, then the two characteristics 
are excluded from having the same state of 
evaluation; they are not similar" (p.187).
This discussion argues that not only can similarity/
dissimilarity occur between sets of elements but also
within a characteristic. This distinction is
disregarded in Unnever and Hembroff's (1988) work.
Unnever and Hembroff (1988) do not refine the
similarity/dissimilarity -- consistency/inconsistency
definition; rather, they state that consistency occurs
when case-related variables point to some obvious
dispositional sentence, and inconsistency occurs when
the same variables do not point to any obvious
dispositional sentence.
The problem with both Hembroff's (1982) and
Unnever and Hembroff's (1988) definitions of
similarity/dissimilarity - consistency/inconsistency is
that they assume universal agreement regarding what
types of expectations are associated with status
characteristics. In the context of judicial decision
making, this assumes that some normative definition of
"obvious dispositional sentence" exists. It does not.
16
Although one might, within a sample, be able to 
identify the harshest case type and/or least harsh case 
type, problems arise when trying to identify cases with 
varying degrees of consistency/inconsistency. To 
illustrate, Table 1 contains a range of 17 hypothetical 
robbery case types. Which are consistent and which are 
inconsistent? Which cases point to an obvious 
dispositional sentence of prison and which point to an 
obvious dispositional sentence of probation? While 
case type 1, it could be argued, identifies a 
"consistent" case type and should "obviously" be placed 
in the dispositional category of prison, many of the 
other case types cannot be so easily identified. In 
addition, at what point does complete status 
inconsistency occur? That is, at what point would 
Unnever and Hembroff (1988) expect diffuse status 
characteristics to decide the interactions?
Unnever and Hembroff's (1988) Research Design
By examining Unnever and Hembroff's (1988) 
research, we see that the authors were able to 
ingeniously sidestep the measurement and definitional
17
Table 1. Criminal Court Case Status Characteristics 
Hypothetical Robbery Case Types
Case type 1: Robbery, 10 felony priors, committed crime while on 
probation
Case type 2: Robbery, 9 felony priors, committed crime while on 
probation
Case type 3: Robbery, 8 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 4: Robbery, 7 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 5: Robbery, 6 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 6: Robbery, 5 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 7: Robbery, 4 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 8: Robbery, 3 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 9: Robbery, 2 felony priors, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 10: Robbery, 1 felony prior, committed crime while on
probation
Case type 11 
Case type 12 
Case type 13 
Case type 14 
Case type 15 
Case type 16 
Case type 17
Robbery, 0 felony priors, not on probation 
Robbery, 1 felony prior, not on probation 
Robbery, 2 felony priors, not on probation
Robbery, 3 felony priors, not on probation
Robbery, 4 felony priors, not on probation
Robbery, 5 felony priors, not on probation
Robbery, 6 felony priors, not on probation
18
problems discussed here. Unnever and Hembroff's 
database consisted of 313 Miami drug offenders 
convicted in 1971. The sample contained 171 
Caucasians, 108 African-Americans, and 34 Hispanics.
The dependent variable was whether the judge decided to 
sentence the defendant to prison or not (133 out of the 
313 were incarcerated). Independent variables included 
race (Caucasian, African-American, Hispanic), 
employment status (employed/not employed), occupational 
status (professional or semiprofessional job/not a 
professional or semiprofessional job), prior conviction 
(prior conviction/no prior conviction), type of drug 
involved in charge (opium/non-opium), number of charges 
(1-5), and whether the most serious arrest charge was 
for sale or possession of a drug. Unnever and Hembroff 
identified all the variables, except race, as 
performance characteristics1.
Unnever and Hembroff note that "we have chosen to include occupation and employment with 
the case-related attributes as part of the performance set for two reasons. First, employment/ 
occupation provides performance information specific to the defendant as do the other case- 
related attributes. Therefore, each of the characteristics we include in the performance set is a 
specific individual attribute. Second, empirically, including occupation and employment in the 
performance set and comparing incarceration probabilities across racial or ethnic categories has 
the effect of holding occupation and employment constant for the different race or ethnic 
categories within that type of case. This allows us to isolate the influence of race/ethnicity on 
judicial decision making" (p.59-60).
19
To test their variant of status characteristics 
theory, the authors generated predicted probabilities 
for ten hypothetical drug cases types (see Table 2). 
Although the authors state that "[t]hese ten cases were 
selected to incorporate the full range of inconsistency 
in the performance set possible for the drug cases in 
the data" (p.68), the implied property space analysis 
is not exhausted nor adequately represented by these 
hypothetical.
The authors concluded that race was least- likely 
to affect case types 1 and 10. For those case types 
with a non-obvious dispositional category, "when the 
states of some of the traits in the performance set 
point to incarceration while the states of others point 
to probation" (p.71), the authors report that race will 
affect case types 5, 6, and 7 the most. In fact, the 
largest predicted effect, by a slight margin, was case 
type 7. These findings, the authors conclude, "quite 
clearly support the theoretical argument we have 
presented. That is, as the performance set approaches 
consistency, the likelihood of sentencing disparities 
decreases. As the performance set approaches 
inconsistency, the likelihood of judges' sentencing
20
Table 2. Criminal Court Case Status Characteristics: 
Hypothetical Case Types Generated By Unnever and Hembroff (1988)
for Predicted Probabilities
Case type 1: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, employed, professional or semi-professional 
occupation, 1 arrest charge, non-opium derivative drug
Case type 2: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, employed, professional or semi-professional 
occupation, 1 arrest charge, opium derivative drug
Case type 3: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, employed, professional or semi-professional 
occupation, 2 arrest charges, opium derivate drug
Case type 4: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, employed, not a professional or semi- 
professional occupation, 2 arrest charges, opium derivate drug
Case type 5: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, unemployed, not a professional or semi- 
professional occupation, 2 charges, opium derivate drug
Case type 6: No prior conviction, arrest charge for possession of
illegal drugs, unemployed, not a professional or semi-professional 
occupation, 3 charges, opium derivate drug
Case type 7: No prior conviction, arrest for sale of illegal
drugs, unemployed, not a professional or semi-professional 
occupation, 3 charges, opium derivative drug
Case type 8: Prior conviction, arrest for sale of illegal drugs,
unemployed, not a professional or semi-professional occupation, 3 
charges, opium derivate drug
Case type 9: Prior conviction, arrest for sale of illegal drugs,
unemployed, not a professional or semi-professional, 4 charges, 
opium derivate drug
Case type 10: Prior conviction, arrest for sale of illegal drugs,
unemployed, not a professional or semi-professional, 5 charges, 
opium derivate drug
21
decisions being influenced by the defendants 1 race or 
ethnicity increases" (p.71).
It should be noted that the authors identify case 
types 1 and 10 as being totally consistent. All six 
variables in case type 1 are ranked as having a 
"preferred" state. All six variables in case type 10 
are ranked as having an "undesirable" state. Unnever 
and Hembroff (1988) also note that "five of the six 
traits [in case type 3] are the preferred state...four 
of the six traits [in case type 4] are the preferred 
state..three of the six [in case type 5] are the 
preferred state...two [in case type 6] are the 
preferred state" (p.70). They do not discuss the 
consistency/inconsistency of case types 2, 7, 8, and 9; 
however, using their logic, it appears that one out of 
the six variables in case type 7 is ranked as having a 
preferred state. According to their definition of 
status inconsistency, Unnever & Hembroff argue that 
race differentials are most likely to occur in case 
types where half of the variables point to 
incarceration and the other half point to probation. 
Within the ten hypotheticals this would appear to be 
case type 5; yet, the race effect is strongest for case 
type 7, which has only 1 preferred state variable.
22
To further complicate the results, remember that 
the findings discussed thus far are based on predicted 
probabilities. In the appendix of their 1988 article, 
Unnever and Hembroff discuss the actual observed 
proportions for each of the hypothetical case types.
When the authors went to examine the actual 
proportions connected with the ten hypothetical case 
types, they found that "this resulted in too few 
defendants per case type to allow for meaningful 
comparisons. We therefore deleted the two variables 
that were statistically insignificant, PROF and Opium" 
(p.75). This left the authors with seven case types 
(see Table 3).
Their findings with these seven case types 
revealed that "[a]1though the number of defendants 
represented in each type of case is still relatively 
small, the general pattern in the observed data 
indicates nonlinearity and nonadditivity in the judge's 
sentencing decision. That is, the largest amount of 
racial sentencing disparity that occurred in these 
actual data was in a case in the intermediate range, 
case type 4. In case type 4, all of the black 
defendants were incarcerated, whereas only 18.2% of the
23
Table 3. Criminal Court Case Status Characteristics: 
Case Types Generated by Unnever and Hembroff (1988) for 
Observed Probabilities
Case type 1: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, 1 arrest charge
Case type 2: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, 2 arrest charges
Case type 3: No prior convictions, arrest charge for possession
of illegal drugs, 3 arrest charges
Case type 4: No prior convictions, arrest charge for sale of
illegal drugs, 2 arrest charges
Case type 5: Prior conviction, arrest charge for sale of illegal
drugs, 2 arrest charges
Case type 6: Prior conviction, arrest charge for sale of illegal
drugs, 3 arrest charges
Case type 7: Prior conviction, arrest charge for sale of illegal
drugs, 4 arrest charges
24
white defendants received prison sentences. The 
percentage of Hispanic defendants incarcerated was 
40.0. The least amount of racial disparity in these 
observed data occurred in case types 1 and 7. These 
two cases are the most dispositionally certain" (p.75).
How small were the samples used in the observed 
probabilities analysis? One hundred nine offenders (58 
Caucasian, 3 6 African-American, and 15 Hispanic) fit 
into one of the seven case types. Regarding case type 
4, the 100% incarceration rate for African-Americans, 
noted by Unnever and Hembroff (1988), was obtained by 
examining five offenders. The 18.2% incarceration rate 
for Caucasians is the result of 2 out of 11 offenders 
being incarcerated, and the 40% incarceration rate for 
Hispanics is the result of 2 out of 5 offenders being 
incarcerated.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the 
authors picked case type 4 to represent a case of 
inconsistency. Using the authors own rationale, 2 out 
of 3 of the variables in case type 4 are ranked as 
having preferred states. Case type 3 also has 2 out of 
3 variables ranked as having preferred states; yet, the 
authors did not identify case type 3 as a case of 
inconsistency. Perhaps this is because the
25
incarceration proportion for Caucasians in case type 3 
was 2/7; 1/2 for African-Americans; and 0/1 for 
Hispanics.
As Unnever and Hembroff's (1988) research reveals, 
the problems surrounding measurement and definitions 
for status characteristics theory have not yet been 
solved. While Hembroff (1982) believed that 
expectation states were formed by (1) combining status 
characteristics through a mathematical weighting 
process and (2) balancing status characteristics in 
situations of total status inconsistency, Unnever & 
Hembroff (1988) omit any process of mathematical 
weighting. They do state that equal weighting of 
characteristics is probably a false assumption but a 
"simplifying" one. Furthermore, Unnever and Hembroff1s 
identification of consistent and inconsistent case 
types had to rely upon hypotheticals, and, even then, 
the decision as to what constitutes consistency/ 
inconsistency remained quite arbitrary.
This critique has thus far focused on the issue of 
measurement and definition; however, other problems 
exist. For one, the status characteristics theory 
literature notes that some characteristics may not give 
rise to any expectations (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch,
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1972; Hembroff 1982). Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 
(1972) state that "[s]tatus characteristics do not 
operate in every situation...When they do we say the 
status characteristic is activated...We know almost 
nothing about the conditions under which a status 
characteristic is activated" (p.244, italics in the 
original).
In addition, while Unnever and Hembroff (1988) 
examined the effects of the offender's race upon
t
sentencing decisions, they did not consider the race of
the judge. Berger, Fisek, Norma, and Zelditch (1977)
state that "status characteristics, and the
expectations they create, are properties of relations,
»
not of individuals. Perhaps this is just another way 
of making the process depend upon the structure of the 
situation, but it is important to emphasize that...it 
is uninformative to talk simply about 'females', 
'blacks', 'managers', and 'good readers'. The status 
of the object matters as much as the status of the 
subject: the interaction of a black male with a white
male should be different from the interaction of the 
same black with a black female" (p.10).
At its present stage of development, status 
characteristics theory cannot be applied validly or
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reliably to judicial decision making processes. My 
efforts to test this theory identified both measurement 
and definitional problems that, at this stage of the 
theory’s development, are insurmountable.
Chapter III 
Design of the Current Research
Data
Data for this research were collected by Brian 
Ostrom for partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (see Ostrom, 1988).
The database contains information on the cases of 255 
assault and 3 86 robbery offenders convicted in 1987 
under the auspices of the Michigan Sentencing 
Guidelines2.
Eighteen different offenses have been statutorily 
placed in the assault crime classification in Michigan. 
The robbery classification contains ten statutory 
offenses (see Table 4).
The database contains 16 legally prescribed 
variables, 11 nonprescribed variables, and statutory 
maximum (see Table 5).
2The database originally contained 257 assault cases and 391 robbery cases; however, after 
removing cases whose standardized residual exceeded 3 in absolute value, 2 assault cases and 5 
robbery cases were eliminated from the analyses.
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Assault
Statutory
Maximum
Life or Term 
of Years
180 Months
120 Months
60 Months
48 Months
24 Months
Table 4. Statutory Offenses for 
and Robbery Crime Classifications, Michigan 1987
Statutory Offenses for 
Assault Crime 
Classification
•Assault w/ intent to 
commit murder 
•Kidnapping
•Assault w/ intent to do 
great bodily harm 
•Assault w/ intent to 
commit felony 
•Assault w/ intent to 
maim
•Torture children
•Assault w/ intent to 
commit murder ATT 
•Kidnapping ATT 
•Assault w/ intent to do 
great bodily harm ATT 
•Assault w/ intent to 
commit felony ATT 
•Assault w/ intent to 
maim ATT
•Torture children ATT
•Felonious Assault 
•Cruelty to children
•Resisting Officer 
•Kill or injure, 
negligent use of firearm 
•Felonious assault ATT 
•Cruelty to children ATT
Statutory Offenses for 
Robbery Crime 
Classification
•Robbery armed 
•Bank robbery 
•Assault w/ intent to 
rob armed
•Robbery unarmed 
•Assault w/ intent to 
rob unarmed
•Larceny from person
•Robbery armed ATT 
•Robbery unarmed ATT 
•Assault w/ intent to 
rob unarmed ATT 
•Assault wI intent to 
rob unarmed ATT 
•Larceny from person ATT
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Table 5. Legally Prescribed and Nonprescribed Status 
Characteristics: Assault and Robbery Case Variables, Michigan
Database 1987
Leoallv Prescribed Nonprescribed
Prior High Severity Felony 
Prior Low Severity Felony 
Prior High Severity Juvenile 
Prior Low Severity Juvenile 
Prior Misdemeanor
Prior Relationship to the Criminal 
Justice System 
Subsequent/Concurrent Convictions 
Weapon Use 
Physical Attack 
Victim Carried Away 
Multiple Victims 
Offender Exploitation 
Professional/Organized Crime Member 
Offender's Role 
Contemporaneous Acts 
Actual Sentence in Months
Race
Gender
Number of Dependents 
Highest Grade Completed 
Assets of at Least $1500 
Drug Use
Type of Attorney
Plea Bargain Occurrence
Alcohol Use
Marital Status
Age
Note: The database also contains the variable, statutory maximum,
which is neither a legally prescribed nor a non-prescribed variable.
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Hypotheses
As was stated earlier, while research on judicial 
decision making has drawn heavily on labeling and 
conflict theory, much of the research has draw on 
little or no theoretical foundation. In addition, 
research has provided inconsistent and sometimes 
contradictory results regarding the determinants of 
sentencing.
Regardless of the theory used or the findings 
reported, questions of bias have led to numerous 
studies and commentaries on the determinants of 
judicial decision making. These same questions of bias 
were also important in motivating the determinate 
sentencing reform movement that began in the late 
1960s-early 1970s (Clear, Hewitt, and Regoli 1978; 
Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, and Tonry 1983).
Judges in Michigan use the Michigan Sentencing 
Guidelines to determine the appropriate sentence for 
individuals convicted of assault, robbery, criminal 
sexual conduct, drug, fraud, homicide, larceny, 
negligent homicide (second degree and manslaughter), 
property destruction, and weapons possession offenses.
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Within each crime group classification there is a 
sentencing guidelines grid for sets of offenses 
carrying the same statutory maximum penalty. In 
scoring a conviction to determine the appropriate 
sentence, the judge must determine a prior record 
score, offense score, and mitigation variable score.
The variables used to determine the prior record score 
for all crime classifications include: prior high
severity felony convictions, prior low severity felony 
convictions, prior high severity similar felony 
convictions, prior low severity similar felony 
convictions, prior juvenile delinquency adjudications, 
prior misdemeanor convictions, current relationship to 
the criminal justice system, prior driving record 
(applies only to negligent homicide crimes), and prior 
adult convictions or juvenile felony type adjudications 
(applies only to negligent homicide crimes).
For assault and robbery crimes, the following 
variables are used to determine offense scores: 
presence, type, and use of weapon; physical attack 
and/or injury; victim carried away or held captive; 
multiple victims; offender exploitation of victim's 
vulnerability; offender's membership in professional/
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organized crime; offender's role; contemporaneous 
criminal acts.
Scoring for mitigating circumstances requires that 
"one or more of the following circumstances existed at 
the time of the offense. i. Avoiding Harm - While 
apprehensive of harm to person or property, the 
offender used reasonable force to avoid the harm. ii. 
Provocation/Passion - Circumstances which are not the 
fault of the offender, and which would similarly 
provoke a reasonable person, caused the offender 
emotional disturbance and temporary loss of self- 
control; while so disturbed, the offender used force 
against the reasonably perceived source of the 
disturbance. iii. Mistake/Inadvertence - The 
Offender's criminal activity was due in significant 
part to a misunderstanding, or ignorance, of a 
significant fact" (Tab 15, Michigan Sentencing 
Guidelines Advisory Committee, 1984).
As Table 5 reveals, the database does not contain 
information on prior high severity similar felony 
convictions, prior low severity similar felony 
convictions, and mitigating circumstances. In 
addition, the data on juvenile adjudications were
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collected as prior high severity juvenile adjudications
and prior low severity adjudications.
The prior record score is placed on the "x" axis
of the sentencing guidelines grid employed by Michigan
judges. Offense severity scores are located on the "y"
axis. The cross-section of these two scores identifies
a recommended sentence range, in months.
Based upon concerns investigated in past
sentencing research, the current research examines the
following questions: ' Do either legally prescribed or
nonprescribed variables alone explain a significant
portion of the sentencing decision? If neither type of
variable explains the variance, what combination of
legally prescribed and nonprescribed does?
To answer these research questions, the following
general hypotheses will be tested using stepwise
multiple regression:
Hypothesis 1: Among legally prescribed and
nonprescribed variables, legally prescribed 
variables alone will provide the best prediction 
(explained variance) in sentencing length.
Hypothesis 2: Among legally prescribed and
nonprescribed variables, nonprescribed variables 
alone will provide the best prediction (explained 
variance) in sentencing length.
Hypothesis 3: Among legally prescribed and
nonprescribed variables, a combination of legally 
prescribed and nonprescribed variables will 
provide the best prediction (explained variance) 
in sentencing length.
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Results
A summary of frequencies for all variables used in 
the analyses is included in Appendices A and B. It 
should be noted that for both assault and robbery 
cases, the majority of offenders had no prior record 
(i.e., no prior high severity felony convictions, no 
prior low severity felony convictions, no prior high 
severity juvenile adjudications, no prior low severity 
juvenile adjudications, zero or one prior misdemeanor).
Correlations for all variables are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. The correlation analyses reveal a high 
degree of independence among most of the legally 
prescribed and nonprescribed variables for both assault 
and robbery cases.
Looking at the most salient correlations for 
assault cases, significant at the .001 level, the 
highest correlation (.8801) is for prior high felony 
convictions and prior high juvenile adjudications. 
Additionally, statutory maximum for the convicted 
offense is correlated at .7076 with actual sentence; 
number of dependents is correlated at -.3995 with 
marital status.
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Table 6. Correlation Analyses: Assault Cases
ACTSEN SMAX HIFEL LOFEL HIJUV LOJUV
ACTSEN 1.0000 .7076** . 1629 .0076 .1452 -.0184
SMAX .7076** 1.0000 .0699 -.0394 . 0670 - .0779
HIFEL .1629 .0699 1.0000 .3381** .8801** .0058
LOFEL .0076 -.0394 .3381** 1.0000 .2696** .2421**
HIJUV .1452 .0670 .8801** .2696** 1.0000 -.0652
LOJUV -.0184 -.0779 .0058 .2421** -.0652 1.0000
MISD .1465 . 0062 . 1718* . 0713 .1965* -.0675
PRIORREL -.0310 -.0505 .1221 .2158* . 0313 .1230
SUBCONV .1024 .0092 .2121* .2878** .2348** -.0073
WEAPON .1883* .1217 -.0052 .0820 .0397 .0223
PHATTACK .1892* .0387 .0091 .1031 - . 0274 . 0551
KIDNAP .1632 .2574** .0559 .0331 -.0184 .0809 .
MULTVICT .0973 . 0566 . 0214 .0123 .0059 .0112
EXPLOIT .1524 .2033* -.0007 -.0226 -.0082 -.0287
MOB .3936** .2183** -.0551 -.0717 -.0502 -.0174
OFFROLE .2029* .0997 .0902 -.0121 .0757 -.0522
CONTEMP .1039 .1711* .0699 .0166 .0169 -.0320
AGE -.0084 .1310 .2213** . 1682 .2180** .0093
RACE .1918* .1300 .1772* .1320 .1684 .0215
SEX -.1882* -.1184 -.0848 -.1103 - .0658 -.0504
DEPEND -.0584 -.0791 - .0075 .0396 -.0155 -.0239
GRADE .0057 -.0472 . 0007 .0396 -.0193 .0021
ASSETS . 1443 . 0833 . 1686 .1433 .1758* -.0058
DRUGS . 0100 .0315 .0623 .0606 . 0460 -.1139
ATTORNEY -.0618 . 0034 -.1356 -.1041 -.1362 -.0042
PLEA .2512** .2655** - .0065 - . 0736 .0261 -.0684
ALC -.0122 -.0591 .0657 -.0039 .0842 -.0096
WED .0592 -.0329 -.0359 .0420 -.0105 -.0058
MISD PRIORREL SUBCONV WEAPON PHATTACK KIDNAP
ACTSEN .1465 -.0310 .1024 .1883* .1892* .1632
SMAX .0062 -.0505 .0092 .1217 .0387 .2574**
HIFEL .1718* .1221 .2121* -.0052 .0091 .0559
LOFEL . 0713 .2158* .2878** .0820 .1031 . 0331
HIJUV .1965* .0313 .2348** . 0397 -.0274 .0184
LOJUV -.0675 .1230 .0073 .0223 .0551 . 0809
MISD 1.0000 .0904 .1556 .0002 .0670 .0922
PRIORREL .0904 1.0000 .1150 -.0281 -.1154 . 0535
SUBCONV .1556 .1150 1..0000 -.0031 .0908 .0298
WEAPON .0002 -.0281 .0031 1.0000 .1488 .0747
PHATTACK .0670 -.1154 .0908 .1488 1.0000 . 0396
KIDNAP - .0922 .0535 .0298 -.0747 .0396 1..0000
MULTVICT .0937 -.0118 .0940 .1271 -.1517 . 0199
EXPLOIT .0769 .0896 .1101 -.3830** -.0119 .2630**
MOB .0673 .0233 .0316 .0769 .1435 . 0308
OFFROLE .0614 -.0069 .0349 .1136 .0699 .0742
CONTEMP -.0958 -.0292 .0489 -.0129 -.1860* .2112*
AGE -.1667 .1223 .0232 .0656 .0300 . 0825
RACE .0152 .0900 .0973 .1803* .0519 .0736
SEX -.1059 .0788 .0376 -.0780 -.0774 .0893
DEPEND -.0707 .0863 . 0237 . 0105 .0299 .0594
GRADE -.0224 .1206 .0241 -.0837 .0332 . 0502
ASSETS .2144* .0885 .1164 .0636 -.0586 .0354
DRUGS .1821* .2021* . 1924* -.1205 -.0465 .0926
ATTORNEY -.1328 .0290 . 1451 .1076 -.1229 . 0509
PLEA -.0603 .0103 . 0115 .0316 .0806 .1609
ALC .1033 .1408 . 0126 -.0400 -.1030 .1244
WED . 0388 -.0168 .0616 .0636 -.0586 .1016
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Table 6
(Continued)
MULTVICT EXPLOIT MOB OFFROLE CONTEMP AGE
ACTSEN .0973 .1524 .3936** .2029* .1039 -.0084
SMAX .0566 .2033* .2183** .0997 .1711* .1310
HIFEL .0214 .0007 -.0551 .0902 .0699 .2213**
LOFEL .0123 .0226 -.0717 -.0121 .0166 .1682
HIJUV .0059 .0082 -.0502 .0757 .0169 .2180**
LOJUV .0112 .0287 -.0174 -.0522 -.0320 .0093
MISD .0937 . 0769 .0673 .0614 -.0958 -.1667
PRIORREL -.0118 .0896 .0233 -.0069 -.0292 .1223
SUBCONV -.0940 .1101 .0316 .0349 -.0489 -.0232
WEAPON .1271 ,3830** .0769 .1136 -.0129 .0656
PHATTACK -.1517 . 0119 .1435 .0699 -.1860* . 0300
KIDNAP .0199 .2630** -.0308 .0742 .2112* . 0825
MULTVICT 1.0000 .0474 .1785* .1589 .1540 -.1650
EXPLOIT .0474 1..0000 .0120 .0545 .1595 .0059
MOB .1785* .0120 1.0000 .1048 -.0246 -.1102
OFFROLE .1589 .0545 .1048 1.0000 -.0991 -.1564
CONTEMP .1540 .1595 -.0246 -.0991 1.0000 .1580
AGE -.1650 .0059 -.1102 -.1564 .1580 1.0000
RACE -.1012 .0851 . 1093 .0796 -.0389 . 0198
SEX -.0713 .0134 -.0389 -.0345 -.0715 -.0478
DEPEND .0907 .0170 -.0295 -.1362 .0348 .2159*
GRADE .0659 .0014 . 0016 . 0396 -.0040 - .0672
ASSETS .0143 .0007 .0551 .0378 .1015 -.2542**
DRUGS -.0180 .1666 -.0879 -.0233 .0594 -.1219
ATTORNEY .0353 .0655 -.0599 .1241 -.0777 .0617
PLEA .0231 .1248 .1518 .2148* -.0617 .0086
ALC .0904 .0185 - . 1009 -.0858 .1100 .0130
WED -.0392 .0244 .0551 . 1018 -.0356 -.2436**
RACE SEX DEPEND GRADE ASSETS DRUGS
ACTSEN .1918* - .1882* -.0584 .0057 . 1443 . 0100
SMAX .1300 -.1184 -.0791 -.0472 .0833 . 0315
HIFEL .1772* -.0848 -.0075 .0007 .1686 .0623
LOFEL . 1320 -.1103 . 0396 .0396 .1433 .0606
HIJUV .1684 -.0658 -.0155 -.0193 .1758* .0460
LOJUV . 0215 -.0504 -.0239 .0021 -.0058 -.1139
MISD .0152 -.1059 -.0707 - . 0224 .2144* .1821*
PRIORREL .0900 .0788 . 0863 .1206 .0885 .2021*
SUBCONV . 0973 -.0376 -.0237 .0241 .1164 .1924*
WEAPON .1803* -.0780 .0105 -.0837 .0636 -.1205
PHATTACK .0519 -.0774 .0299 .0332 -.0586 -.0465
KIDNAP . 0736 -.0893 .0594 .0502 .0354 .0926
MULTVICT -.1012 -.0713 .0907 .0659 . 0143 -.0180
EXPLOIT -.0851 . 0134 -.0170 -.0014 .0007 .1666
MOB .1093 -.0389 -.0295 .0016 . 0551 - .0879
OFFROLE .0796 -.0345 -.13 62 .0396 . 0378 -.0233
CONTEMP -.0389 -.0715 .0348 -.0040 .1015 .0594
AGE .0198 -.0478 .2159* -.0672 -.2542** -.1219
RACE 1. 0000 .1416 .0276 -.1382 .2091* -.0344
SEX .1416 1. 0000 .0680 .0276 -.0280 .0179
DEPEND . 0276 .0680 1.0000 -.0761 -.0983 .0799
GRADE -.1382 .0276 -.0761 1.0000 -.0840 .0105
ASSETS .2091* -.0280 -.0983 - .0840 1.0000 .1733*
DRUGS -.0344 .0179 . 0799 .0105 .1733* 1.0000
ATTORNEY -.2458** -.1024 -.0314 .1884* -.3089** -.1243
PLEA .1259 -.0368 .0179 .0247 . 0065 -.0306
ALC -.2282** .0021 .0054 -.0346 .0259 .2801**
WED .0728 -.0280 -.3995** -.0900 .2404** .0084
Table 6
(Continued)
ATTORNEY PLEA ALC WED
ACTSEN -.0618 .2512** -.0122 .0592
SMAX .0034 .2655** -.0591 -.0329
HIFEL -.1356 .0065 .0657 -.0359
LOFEL -.1041 .0736 -.0039 .0420
HIJUV -.13 62 .0261 .0842 -.0105
LOJUV -.0042 .0684 -.0096 -.0058
MISD -.1328 .0603 .1033 . 0388
PRIORREL .0290 .0103 .1408 -.0168
SUBCONV -.1451 .0115 -.0126 .0616
WEAPON .1076 .0316 -.0400 .0636
PHATTACK -.1229 . 0806 -.1030 -.0586
KIDNAP -.0509 .1609 -.1244 -.1016
MULTVICT .0353 .0231 . 0904 - . 0392
EXPLOIT -.0655 .1248 .0185 -.0244
MOB -.0599 .1518 -.1009 .0551
OFFROLE .1241 .2148* -.0858 .1018
CONTEMP -.0777 .0617 . 1100 -.0356
AGE .0617 .0086 .0130 -.2436*
RACE -.2458** .1259 -.2282** . 0728
SEX -.1024 .0368 . 0021 -.0280
DEPEND -.0314 .0179 .0054 -.3995*
GRADE .1884* .0247 -.0346 - . 0900
ASSETS -.3089** .0065 . 0259 .2404*
DRUGS -.1243 . 0306 .2801** . 0084
ATTORNEY 1.0000 .0501 -.0157 -.0311
PLEA .0501 1..0000 -.1376 .0065
ALC -.0157 .1376 1. 0000 .1404
WED -.0311 .0065 . 1404 1.0000
2-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** .001
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Table 7. Correlation Analyses: Robbery Cases
ACTSEN SMAX HIFEL LOFEL HIJUV LOJUV
ACTSEN 1.0000 .3333** .3471** .2917** .3184** -.0137
SMAX .3333** 1.0000 .0424 .1048 . 0387 .0460
HIFEL .3471** . 0424 1.0000 .3131** .8844** .0839
LOFEL .2917** .1048 .3131** 1.0000 .3180** .2690**
HIJUV .3184** . 0387 ..8844** .3180** 1.0000 .0623
LOJUV -.0137 . 0460 .0839 .2690** .0623 1. 0000
MISD .1390* .0859 -.0426 .1368 -.0600 -.0055
PRIORREL .0278 -.0186 .1031 .2780** .0798 .1195
SUBCONV .1467* .0641 .2579** .2453** .2311** . 0310
WEAPON .1739* .4214** -.0631 -.0580 -.0657 .0485
PHATTACK . 1663* -.0626 -.0583 .0451 -.1075 -.0254
KIDNAP .1855** .0843 -.0557 -.0756 -.0853 -.0601
MULTVICT . 1038 . 0818 .0604 . 0099 .0661 .0908
EXPLOIT .0548 -.0895 .0126 -.0117 - .0015 -.0991
MOB .1710* . 0490 .0910 .1298 .0836 . 0844
OFFROLE .0156 .0376 -.1005 -.0408 -.0923 -.0347
CONTEMP .2639** .0241 -.0252 -.0429 -.0232 -.0195
AGE -.0415 -.0806 -.0293 - . 0377 -.0269 -.0101
PACE .1286 -.0734 .1093 .1398* .1277 -.0342
SEX -.0456 -.1014 -.0823 -.0589 -.0712 .0374
DEPEND -.0298 -.0098 -.0509 -.0655 -.0468 -.0176
GRADE .0754 . 0485 .0729 .082 8 .0323 -.0801
ASSETS -.0296 .0518 -.0811 -.1011 -.1272 -.0479
DRUGS . 0542 .0796 .0699 -.0014 .0228 -.0818
ATTORNEY -.1078 . 0372 -.1591* -.0684 -.1591* -.0299
PLEA . 1080 -.0037 .0892 .1587* .0581 .1587 ^
ALC . 0854 . 0303 -.0137 -.0081 -.0499 -.0441
WED -.0441 -.0444 -.1648* -.0591 -.1954** -.0515
MISD PRIORREL SUBCONV WEAPON PHATTACK KIDNAP
ACTSEN .1390* . 0278 .1467* .1739* .1663* . 1855**
SMAX . 0859 -.0186 .0641 .4214** -.0 62 6 .0843
HIFEL -.0426 .1031 .2579** - .0631 -.0583 -.0557
LOFEL . 13 68 .2780** .2453** -.0580 . 0451 -.0756
HIJUV -.0600 .0798 .2311** -.0657 -.1075 -.0853
LOJUV -.0055 .1195 .0310 .0485 -.0254 -.0601
MISD 1. 0000 -.0062 . 1177 .0312 .0311 .1696*
PRIORREL -.0062 1.0000 .1226 -.1059 .0282 -.0576
SUBCONV . 1177 .1226 1.0000 .0191 .0525 .0031
WEAPON . 0312 -.1059 .0191 1.0000 -.0024 .0148
PHATTACK . 0311 .0282 .0525 -.0024 1.0000 .1124
KIDNAP .1696* -.0576 . 0031 . 0148 .1124 1. 0000
MULTVICT . 0105 -.0246 -.0645 .2205** .0528 .0352
EXPLOIT -.0562 .0090 . 0527 -.0945 .1593* .1718*
MOB . 0982 . 0889 .0479 -.0610 -.0543 . 0029
OFFROLE . 0297 .0075 -.0115 .1291 . 1510* . 1081
CONTEMP . 0221 • -.0161 .0022 -.0425 -.0057 .0975
AGE -.0277 .0975 -.0385 -.0313 -.0372 - . 0171
RACE .0131 -.0514 . 0924 -.0005 .0115 -.0172
SEX -.0269 -.0165 -.0325 -.0627 . 0740 -.0675
DEPEND -.0027 -.0514 - . 0668 .0351 . 0048 -.0297
GRADE -.1689* -.0933 -.0203 .0786 -.0631 -.1018
ASSETS -.0426 -.0254 -.0796 .0607 -.0408 -.0389
DRUGS . 0968 .1031 .1127 -.0115 .0608 .0887
ATTORNEY -.1698* -.1020 -.0929 .0546 -.0074 -.0696
PLEA -.0156 .0661 .0251 -.0444 .0705 -.0361
ALC .1087 . 0661 .0666 -.0091 . 0253 .0706
WED . 0729 -.0187 .0322 .0662 . 0702 . 0995
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Table 7
(Continued)
MULTVICT EXPLOIT MOB OFFROLE CONTEMP AGE
ACTSEN .1038 .0548 .1710* .0156 .2639** -.0415
SMAX .0818 - .0895 .0490 .0376 .0241 -.0806
HIFEL .0604 . 0126 .0910 -.1005 -.0252 -.0293
LOFEL .0099 -.0117 .1298 -.0408 -.0429 -.0377
HIJUV .0661 -.0015 .0836 -.0923 -.0232 -.0269
LOJUV . 0908 -.0991 .0844 -.0347 -.0195 -.0101
MISD . 0105 -.0562 .0982 .0297 . 0221 - . 0277
PRIORREL -.0246 .0090 .0889 .0075 -.0161 .0975
SUBCONV -.0645 .0527 .0479 -.0115 .0022 -.0385
WEAPON .2205** -.0945 -.0610 .1291 -.0425 -.0313
PHATTACK . 0528 .1593* -.0543 .1510* -.0057 -.0372
KIDNAP . 0352 .1718* .0029 .1081 .0975 - . 0171
MULTVICT 1. 0000 -.0610 .1976** .1304 .0611 -.0338
EXPLOIT -.0610 1.0000 -.0448 . 0899 .0594 -.0281
MOB . 197 6*v* -.0448 1.0000 .0545 .2524** -.0136
OFFROLE .1304 .0899 .0545 1.0000 -.0077 -.0508
CONTEMP .0611 .0594 .2524** -.0077 1.0000 -.0208
AGE -.0338 -.0281 -.0136 -.0508 -.0208 1.0000
RACE -.0448 -.0310 .0154 -.0288 -.1252 -.0643
SEX .0130 -.0080 .0651 .0364 -.0340 -.0114
DEPEND .0793 .0267 -.0236 .0539 -.0362 -.0050
GRADE . 0752 -.0912 .0284 -.1355 .0095 - . 0339
ASSETS -.0345 -.0448 .0371 -.0742 .0254 -.0136
DRUGS .0920 .0820 .0357 .0127 . 0952 -.0592
ATTORNEY -.0298 .0538 -.0664 . 0153 -.1125 -.0215
PLEA -.0071 .0018 -.0633 -.0330 -.1225 - . 0209
ALC -.0582 .1141 -.0654 .0528 . 0041 .0713
WED -.0122 .0412 -.0478 .1113 -.0511 .0168
RACE SEX DEPEND GRADE ASSETS DRUGS
ACTSEN .1286 - .0456 -.0298 .0754 -.0296 .0542
SMAX -.0734 -.1014 -.0098 .0485 .0518 .0796
HIFEL .1093 - .0823 -.0509 .0729 -.0811 .0699
LOFEL .1398* -.0589 -.0655 . 0828 -.1011 -.0014
HIJUV .1277 -.0712 -.0468 .0323 -.1272 .0228
LOJUV -.0342 .0374 -.0176 -.0801 -.0479 -.0818
MISD .0131 -.0269 -.0027 -.1689* -.0426 .0968
PRIORREL -.0514 -.0165 -.0514 -.0933 -.0254 .1031
SUBCONV .0924 -.0325 -.0668 -.0203 -.0796 .1127
WEAPON -.0005 -.0627 .0351 .0786 .0607 -.0115
PHATTACK .0115 .0740 .0048 -.0631 -.0408 .0608
KIDNAP -.0172 -.0675 -.0297 -.1018 -.0389 .0887
MULTVICT -.0448 .0130 .0793 .0752 -.0345 .0920
EXPLOIT -.0310 -.0080 . 0267 -.0912 -.0448 .0820
MOB .0154 .0651 -.0236 .0284 . 0371 .0357
OFFROLE -.0288 .0364 .0539 -.1355 -.0742 .0127
CONTEMP -.1252 -.0340 -.03 62 .0095 .0254 .0952
AGE -.0643 ' -.0114 -.0050 -.0339 -.0136 -.0592
RACE 1.0000 -.0240 -.0485 .0389 -.0827 -.2056**
SEX -.0240 1.0000 -.0198 -.0546 -.0538 .0787
DEPEND -.0485 -.0198 1.0000 -.0007 .1069 .0845
GRADE .0389 -.0546 -.0007 1.0000 .1265 -.0260
ASSETS -.0827 -.0538 .1069 .1265 1.0000 .0115
DRUGS -.2056** . 0787 .0845 - . 0260 .0115 1.0000
ATTORNEY -.1063 -.0439 -.0373 .1587* .1786** .0277
PLEA .1190 -.0411 -.0364 .1564* . 0080 -.1236
ALC -.3673** -.0127 .0591 -.1924** -.0905 .3226**
WED .0464 . 0664 .0292 -.0545 -.1749* .0206
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ATTORNEY PLEA ALC WED
ACTSEN -.1078 .1080 .0854 -.0441
SMAX .0372 -.0037 .0303 -.0444
HIFEL -.1591* . 0892 -.0137 -.1648*
LOFEL -.0684 .1587* -.0081 -.0591
HIJUV -.1591* .0581 -.0499 -.1954**
LOJUV -.0299 .1587* -.0441 -.0515
MISD -.1698* -.0156 .1087 .0729
PRIORREL -.1020 .0661 .0661 -.0187
SUBCONV -.0929 .0251 .0666 .0322
WEAPON .0546 -.0444 -.0091 .0662
PHATTACK -.0074 .0705 .0253 .0702
KIDNAP -.0696 -.0361 . 0706 .0995
MULTVICT -.0298 -.0071 -.0582 -.0122
EXPLOIT .0538 .0018 .1141 .0412
MOB -.0664 -.0633 -.0654 -.0478
OFFROLE .0153 - . 0330 .0528 .1113
CONTEMP -.1125 -.1225 .0041 -.0511
AGE -.0215 -.0209 .0713 .0168
RACE -.1063 .1190 -.3673** . 0464
SEX -.0439 -.0411 -.0127 ,0664
DEPEND -.0373 -.0364 .0591 .0292
GRADE .1587* .1564* -.1924** -.0545
ASSETS .1786** .0080 -.0905 -.1749*
DRUGS . 0277 -.1236 .3226** .0206
ATTORNEY 1. 0000 .0407 -.0413 .0081
PLEA .0407 1.0000 -.1881** -.1162
ALC -.0413 -.1881** 1.0000 .0047
WED .0081 -.1162 .0047 1.0000
2-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** - .001
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For robbery cases, the most notable correlations, 
significant at the .001 level, are among prior high 
felony convictions and prior high juvenile 
adjudications (.8844) and weapon use and statutory 
maximum (.4214).
Stepwise regression analyses, with actual sentence 
as the dependent variable, were done using legally 
prescribed and non-prescribed variables, as well as 
statutory maximum, as predictor variables. Six 
equations were tested for both assault and robbery 
cases (see Tables 8 and 9). The first equation 
regressed the dependent variable of actual sentence on 
all legally prescribed variables. In the second 
equation, actual sentence is regressed on all legally 
prescribed variables and statutory maximum. Actual 
sentence is regressed on all nonprescribed variables in 
the third equation and all nonprescribed variables and 
statutory maximum in the fourth equation. In the fifth 
equation, actual sentence is regressed on all legally 
prescribed and nonprescribed variables; the final 
equation regressed actual sentence on all legally
Table 8. Multiple Regression (Method Stepwise) 
Dependent Variable = Actual Sentence in Months
Assault Cases
Equation 1 -- Legally Prescribed Variables
Step Variable R 2 Beta
1 OFFROLE .04295 OFFROLE
OFFROLE 
HIFEL
OFFROLE 
HIFEL 
WEAPON
OFFROLE 
HIFEL 
WEAPON 
EXPLOIT
OFFROLE 
HIFEL 
WEAPON 
EXPLOIT 
PHATTACK
Variable
OFFROLE
HIFEL
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
PHATTACK
R 2
.04295 
. 07427
.10440
.14897
.16710
Sig T
207233 . 0009
194264 .0016
177450 . 0038
173920 . 0043
177023 .0034
174782 . 0040
144435 .0158
179148 .0024
260328 . 0001
228416 . 0004
138806 .0194
178939 .0023
232710 .0003
222158 . 0005
137392 . 0207
Equation 2 -- Legally prescribed variables and statutory maximum
Step Variable R 2 Beta Si
1 SMAX .49236 SMAX .701684 . 0000
2 PHATTACK .51455 SMAX
PHATTACK
.693558 
.149188
.0000
.0008
3 MISD .53145 SMAX
PHATTACK
MISD
. 691120 
.143173 
.130168
.0000 
.0011 
. 0029
4 OFFROLE .54285 SMAX
PHATTACK
MISD
OFFROLE
. 678309 
.136733 
.125083 
.107917
. 0000 
.0016 
.0038 
.0132
5 HIFEL .55185 SMAX
PHATTACK
MISD
OFFROLE
HIFEL
.670452 
.137950 
.102159 
.102827 
.098185
. 0000 
. 0014 
. 0203 
.0174 
.0262
Equation 3 -- Nonprescribed variables
Step Variable R 2 Beta Si
1 PLEA .06310 PLEA .251199 .0001
2 SEX .09518 PLEA .244598 .0002
SEX -.179229 .0053
3 RACE .13124 PLEA .219179 .0006
SEX -.207569 .0012
RACE .193545 .0026
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Equation 4 -- Nonprescribed variables and statutory maximum
Step Variable R 2 Beta Si
1 SMAX .50069 SMAX .707593 . 0000
•2 SEX .51176 SMAX . 695049 .0000
SEX -.105953 .0252
3 RACE .52590 SMAX .676965 . 0000
SEX -.125296 . 0083
RACE .121493 .0105
4 AGE .53723 SMAX .690485 .0000
SEX -.128960 . 0061
RACE .122381 .0093
AGE -.107430 . 0206
Equation 5 -- Legally prescribed and nonprescribed variables
Step Variable R 2 Beta Sig
1 PLEA .06310 PLEA .251199 .0001
2 WEAPON .09568 PLEA
WEAPON
.245488
.180576
.0001
.0049
3 EXPLOIT .13933 PLEA
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
.214134
.269158
.228701
.0008 
. 0001 
.0009
4 HIFEL .16683 PLEA
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
HIFEL
.215137
.270115
.229053
.165839
. 0006 
. 0001 
. 0008 
.0073
5 SEX .18913 PLEA
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
HIFEL
SEX
.210175
.257648
.226901
.152982
.150465
.0007
.0001
.0007
.0126
.0144
6 RACE .20884 PLEA
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
HIFEL
SEX
RACE
.190423 
.231284 
.232282 
.124096 
. 176855 
.148914
. 0021 
. 0006 
.0005 
. 0446 
.0044 
.0201
7 PHATTACK .22367 PLEA
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
HIFEL
SEX
RACE
PHATTACK ,
.182451
.212445
.227116
.124180
.168433
.145240
.123906
. 0031 
. 0016 
.0006 
.0430 
.0064 
.0225 
.0420
Equation 6 -- Legally prescribed and nonprescribed variables and statutory maximum
Step Variable R2 Beta Sig T
1 SMAX .50069 SMAX .707593 .0000
2 PHATTACK .52692 SMAX .701328 .0000
PHATTACK .162091 .0005
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Equation 6 continued 
Step Variable R 2
3 MISD .54424
4 OFFROLE .55752
Table 8 
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Beta Sig
SMAX .700846 . 0000
PHATTACK .153270 .0009
MISD .131893 .0040
SMAX .689572 .0000
PHATTACK .146022 .0013
MISD .125315 .0056
OFFROLE .116259 .0105
Table 9. Multiple Regression (Method Stepwise) 
Dependent Variable = Actual Sentence in Months
Assault Cases
Equation 1 -- Legally prescribed variables
Step Variable R 2 Beta S
1 HIFEL .14407 HIFEL .379570 .0000
2 CONTEMP .18988 HIFEL
CONTEMP
.386386
.214134
.0000
.0000
3 WEAPON .23087 HIFEL
CONTEMP
WEAPON
.393419
.222159
.202742
. 0000 
.0000 
.0000
4 PHATTACK .26353 HIFEL
CONTEMP
WEAPON
PHATTACK
.403034 
.226521 
.203045 
.181012
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
5 LOFEL .28778 HIFEL
CONTEMP
WEAPON
PHATTACK
LOFEL
.349209
.231036
.211459
.172268
.165257
.0000 
.0000 
. 0000 
.0001 
.0004
6 MISD .29590 HIFEL
CONTEMP
WEAPON
PHATTACK
LOFEL
MISD
.356515 
.229412 
.208875 
.170542 
.148439 
.091566
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0001
.0015
.0372
7 EXPLOIT .30445 HIFEL
CONTEMP
WEAPON
PHATTACK
LOFEL
MISD
EXPLOIT
.352288 
.224908 
.215916 
.156005 
.151910 
.096187 
.094129
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0004
.0011
.0281
.0318
Equation 2 -- Legally prescribed variables and statutory maximum
Step Variable R 2 Beta S
1 HIFEL .14407 HIFEL .379570 .0000
2 SMAX .23358 HIFEL
SMAX
.359232
.299875
.0000
.0000
3 PHATTACK .27445 HIFEL
SMAX
PHATTACK
.368650
.317693
.203216
.0000
.0000
.0000
4 CONTEMP .31651 HIFEL
SMAX
PHATTACK
CONTEMP
.376002
.308925
.207394
.205432
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
5 LOFEL .33018 HIFEL
SMAX
PHATTACK
CONTEMP
LOFEL
.335955 
.298079 
.199861 
.209038 
.124434
. 0000 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
.0056
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Equation 2 continued
Step Variable R 2 Beta Sig T
6 WEAPON .33944 HIFEL
SMAX
PHATTACK
CONTEMP
LOFEL
WEAPON
.339150
.253169
.195604
.215408
.134827
.106273
. 0000 
. 0000 
.0000 
.0000 
.0027 
.0217
7 EXPLOIT .34838 HIFEL
SMAX
PHATTACK
CONTEMP
LOFEL
WEAPON
EXPLOIT
.334334
.256222
.181120
.210701
.138874
.112333
.096180
.0000 
. 0000 
.0000 
.0000 
.0019 
.0149“ 
.0233
Equation 3 -- Nonprescribed variables
Step Variable R 2 Beta Sic
1 RACE .01963 RACE .140123 . 0063
2 ALC .03359 RACE
ALC
.186020 
.126741
. 0007 
.0203
3 GRADE .04920 RACE
ALC
GRADE
.170949
.143175
.127613
.0018 
. 0089 
.0135
4 PLEA .06105 RACE
ALC
GRADE
PLEA
.163156
.160076
.141674
.111239
. 0028 
. 0036 
.0063 
.0304
Equation 4 -- Nonprescribed variables and statutory maximum
Step Variable R 2 Beta Sic
1 SMAX .10636 SMAX .326129 .0000
2 RACE .13177 SMAX
RACE
.335439 
.159681
.0000
.0010
3 ALC .14497 SMAX
RACE
ALC
.334315
.204247
.123245
. .0000 
. 0001 
.0166
4 GRADE .15865 SMAX
RACE
ALC
GRADE
.331511 
.189978 
.138666 
.119525
. 0000 
.0002 
.0071 
. 0141
5 PLEA .16977 SMAX
RACE
ALC
GRADE
PLEA
.330415
.182366
.155052
.133172
.107744
.0000
.0004
.0028
.0064
.0260
48
Table 9
(Continued)
Equation 5 -- Legally prescribed and nonprescribed variables
Step Variable R 2 Beta Si
1 HIFEL .12970 HIFEL .360142 . 0000
2 CONTEMP .18323 HIFEL .365274 .0000
CONTEMP .231423 .0000
3 WEAPON .22495 HIFEL .373049 .0000
CONTEMP .238468 .0000
WEAPON .204509 . 0000
4 PHATTACK .25590 HIFEL .384574 .0000
CONTEMP .241702 .0000
WEAPON .204311 .0000
PHATTACK 176346 .0001
5 LOFEL .28200 HIFEL .330626 . 0000
CONTEMP .245759 . 0000
WEAPON .212616 . 0000
PHATTACK .167915 .0002
LOFEL .170717 .0003
6 MISD .29313 HIFEL .340695 .0000
CONTEMP .244480 .0000
WEAPON .209706 .0000
PHATTACK .166382 .0002
LOFEL .152028 .0012
MISD .107126 . 0160
7 AGE .30376 HIFEL .330538 . 0000
CONTEMP .240938 .0000
WEAPON .210540 .0000
PHATTACK .171939 .0001
LOFEL .153564 .0010
MISD .105466 .0170
AGE .103796 . 0178
8 RACE .31116 HIFEL .324107 .0000
CONTEMP .249921 . 0000
WEAPON .210008 . 0000
PHATTACK .171125 .0001
LOFEL .143256 .0022
MISD .105512 . 0165
AGE .090093 .0412
RACE .088787 .0468
9 ALC .32297 HIFEL .319601 .0000
CONTEMP .252821 .0000
WEAPON .211331 .0000
PHATTACK .167932 . 0001
LOFEL .144541 .0019
MISD .092889 .0345
AGE .100362 .0227
RACE .130732 .0059
ALC .117982 .0116
10 PLEA .33054 HIFEL .314639 .0000
CONTEMP .262465 .0000
WEAPON .214257 .0000
PHATTACK .161859 .0002
LOFEL .134675 .0038
• MISD .093886 .0319
AGE .110614 .0123
RACE .127768 .0069
ALC .132031 .0051
PLEA .090519 . 0421
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Equation 6 -- Legally prescribed and nonprescribed variables and statutory maximum
Step Variable R 2 Beta Si
1 HIFEL .12970 HIFEL .360142 . 0000
2 SMAX .22255 HIFEL .341500 .0000
SMAX .305275 .0000
3 CONTEMP .27025 HIFEL .346927 .0000
SMAX .295810 . 0000
CONTEMP .218660 . 0000
4 PHATTACK .31130 HIFEL .359157 .0000
SMAX .313552 .0000
CONTEMP .221640 .0000
PHATTACK .203839 . 0000
5 RACE .33031 HIFEL .341390 . 0000
SMAX .322222 .0000
CONTEMP .235077 . 0000
PHATTACK .203674 . 0000
RACE .139963 . 0012
6 LOFEL .34179 HIFEL .307221 .0000
SMAX .311287 . 0000
CONTEMP .236807 . 0000
PHATTACK .197165 .0000
RACE .127279 .0033
LOFEL .114360 .0113
7 ALC .35302 HIFEL .304859 .0000
SMAX .310062 .0000
CONTEMP .239962 . 0000
PHATTACK .193270 .0000
RACE .169212 . 0003
LOFEL .113263 .0114
ALC .113851 . 0116
8 AGE .36161 HIFEL .296878 .0000
SMAX .308284 .0000
CONTEMP .235552 .0000
PHATTACK .197882 .0000
RACE .157409 .0007
LOFEL .116163 .0092
ALC .122861 . 0064
AGE .094874 .0263
9 WEAPON .37035 HIFEL .300293 .0000
SMAX .264001 .0000
CONTEMP .240761 .0000
PHATTACK .193474 .0000
RACE .153931 .0008
LOFEL . 126541 .0046
ALC .124470 .0055
AGE .096698 .0228
WEAPON .103428 .0243
10 PLEA .37692 HIFEL .295650 .0000
SMAX .262101 .0000
CONTEMP .249858 .0000
PHATTACK .187651 .0000
RACE .151070 . 0010
LOFEL .117754 . 0083
ALC .137707 .0023
AGE .106319 .0126
WEAPON .106976 . 0194
PLEA .084349 .0496
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prescribed and nonprescribed variables and statutory 
maximum3.
For assault cases, the sixth equation, which 
regressed actual sentence on all legally prescribed 
variables, nonprescribed variables, and statutory 
maximum, accounted for the largest amount of variance 
(r2=.55752), followed closely by equation 2, which 
regressed actual sentence on all legally prescribed 
variables and statutory maximum (r2=.55185) and 
equation 4, which regressed actual sentence on all 
nonprescribed variables and statutory maximum 
(r2=.53723). The single best predictor overall for 
assault cases was statutory maximum (with a Beta range 
of .670452 to .707593). While the equation of legally 
prescribed and nonprescribed variables (equation 5) was 
able to explain 22 percent of the variance (r2=.22367), 
the addition of statutory maximum (equation 6) 
increased explained variance to 56 percent (r2=55752).
Of the 11 legally prescribed variables used in 
equations 1, 2, 5, and 6 for assault cases, the
3Due to lack of variance, the following variables were not entered in regression analyses for 
assault cases: prior low severity juvenile adjudications, victim carried away, 
professional/organized crime member, contemporaneous acts. Similarly, the following variables  ^
were not entered in regression analyses for robbery cases: prior low severity juvenile 
adjudications, victim carried away, professional/ organized crime member, gender, assets, and 
marital status.
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following were identified as significant predictors: 
offender's role in the convicted offense, prior high 
severity felony convictions, weapon use, exploitation 
of the victim's vulnerability, physical attack, and 
prior misdemeanors. Of the 11 nonprescribed variables 
used in equations 3, 4, 5, and 6, plea, gender, race, 
and age were significant predictors.
For robbery cases, the sixth equation, which 
regressed actual sentence on all legally prescribed 
variables, nonprescribed variables, and statutory 
maximum, accounted for the largest amount of variance 
(r2=.37692), followed by equation 1, which regressed 
actual sentence on all legally prescribed variables 
(r2=.30445), equation 2, which regressed actual 
sentence on all legally prescribed variables and 
statutory maximum (r2=.34838), and equation 5, which 
regressed actual sentence on all legally prescribed and 
nonprescribed variables (r2=.33054). The single best 
predictor for robbery cases overall was prior high 
severity felony convictions (with a Beta range of 
.295650 to .403034) . The second best predictor was 
statutory maximum (with a Beta range of .253169 to 
.335439) .
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Of the 12 legally prescribed variables used in 
equations 1, 2, 5, and 6, the following were identified 
as significant predictors: prior high severity felony
convictions, contemporaneous acts, weapon use, physical 
attack, prior low severity felony convictions, prior 
misdemeanors, and exploitation of the victim's 
vulnerability. Of the 8 nonprescribed variables used 
in equations 3, 4, 5, and 6, race, alcohol use, highest 
grade compl*eted, plea, and age were significant 
predictors.
While the results of the regression analyses for 
assault cases provides some support for hypothesis 3, 
that among legally prescribed and nonprescribed 
variables, a combination of legally prescribed and 
nonprescribed variables will provide the best 
prediction (explained variance) in sentencing length, 
the strongest predictor of variance is neither legally 
prescribed nor nonprescribed variables but, rather, 
statutory maximum. For robbery cases, hypothesis 1 
received the strongest support. That is, among legally 
prescribed and nonprescribed variables, legally 
prescribed variables alone will provide the best 
prediction (explained variance) in sentencing length.
Chapter IV 
Discussion
While much of the past research on sentencing has 
focused on the effects of extra-legal variables, a 
growing number have included an examination of legal 
variables as well. As has been stated previously, 
findings from these studies have been varied and 
contradictory. While all have found that various legal 
variables explain some of the variance in sentencing 
decisions, not all have reported extra-legal variable 
effects. Of those that have found significant extra- 
legal variable effects, the relationship between extra- 
legal variables and sentencing is frequently not large 
(Hagan and Bumiller, 1983) .
The analyses of Michigan sentencing data reveal 
that nonprescribed variables (i.e., extra-legal 
variables) are the least predictive. As with past 
research, this does not negate the significance of 
disparity caused by such variables as race, gender, and 
age; rather, it supports the assertion that sentencing 
decisions are best understood through a combination of % 
legal and extra-legal variables.
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The Michigan Sentencing Guidelines are intended to 
"promote consistency in sentencing" by providing judges 
with extensive criteria for making case determinations. 
Furthermore, the Guidelines were developed "to reflect 
past sentencing practices of the state's trial judges". 
The present study was able to examine virtually all 
prior record and offense severity criteria promoted by 
the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines Project for this 
purpose. In addition, 11 extra-legal variables and 
statutory maximum were examined.
The selected independent variables were able to 
explain 55% of the variance in assault cases and 3 8% of 
the variance in robbery cases. Unexplained variance 
may have been due to sampling error. Or, unmeasured 
variables may be critical. For example, attributes of 
judges such as race, age, and gender may influence 
decisions, or the relationship between original and 
conviction charges may be a critical factor.
Regardless, it is surprising that criteria specifically 
developed for the purpose of increasing sentence 
uniformity and reflecting past sentencing practices 
were able to explain at best slightly more than half of 
♦sentencing variance.
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While the present research cannot reveal whether 
sentencing uniformity has increased or decreased due to 
the use of sentencing guidelines, the results suggest 
that determinants of sentence length for convicted 
felons differ by offense type (i.e., assault versus 
robbery). For assault cases, six of the offender and 
offense criteria were significant predictors of 
sentence length (i.e., offender's role in the convicted 
offense, prior high severity felony convictions, weapon 
use, exploitation of the victim's vulnerability, 
physical attack, and prior misdemeanors). Seven of the 
offender and offense criteria for robbery cases were 
significant predictors (i.e., prior high severity 
felony convictions, contemporaneous acts, weapon use, 
physical attack, prior low severity felony convictions, 
prior misdemeanors, and exploitation of the victim's 
vulnerability). In spite of the fact that the Michigan 
Sentencing Guidelines Project provides that the exact 
same variables should be used in determining the 
sentence length of assault and robbery cases4, it
4Although the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines Project determined that judges should examine 
the same offender and offense criteria when determining sentence length for assault and robbery 
cases, the weight of the offense score is slightly different for the two offenses. That is, once 
judges have obtained an offense score based upon weapon use, physical attack, victim carried 
away, multiple victims, offender exploitation of victim's vulnerability, professional/ organized 
crime member, offender's role, and contemporaneous acts, they place an offender at an offense
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appears that not all criteria are being considered in a 
significant or uniform manner.
Moreover, statutory maximum of the conviction 
charge was the best predictor of sentence length in 
assault cases and the second best predictor of sentence 
length in robbery cases. It may be that statutory 
maximum is a proxy measure of offense severity and/or 
reflects some shared understanding within the judiciary 
regarding sentence length determination. If this is 
the case, it seems possible that Sentencing Guidelines 
criteria are not discerning variables relevant to the 
sentencing decision.
Future research and theory may wish to explore the 
relationship between sentencing determinants and nature 
of the offense more closely. Additionally, the 
relationship of statutory maximum to the sentencing 
process requires further examination.
severity level. Offense severity level I is the least severe; offense severity level III is the most 
severe. For assault cases, a total offense score of 0-3 places an offender at offense severity level I; 
a score of 4-5 places an offender at offense severity level II; a score of 5+ places an offender at 
offense severity level in. For robbery cases, a total offense score of 0-3 places an offender at 
offense severity level I; a score of 4-7 places an offender at offense severity level II; a score of 84- 
places an offender at offense severity level IH.
57
Appendix A. Frequencies for Assault Case Variables
ACTSEN actual sentence in months
Valid Cum
Value Label
SMAX
Value Label
(Life or term of years)
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
0 39 15 .3 15 .3 15 .3
1 4 1.6 1. 6 16 . 9
2 2 .8 .8 17 . 6
3 7 2.7 2.7 20.4
4 2 .8 .8 21.2
6 15 5.9 5 . 9 27 .1
8 2 .8 .8 27.8
9 10 3.9 3 . 9 31.8
10 1 .4 .4 32.2
12 41 16.1 16 .1 48 .2
13 2 .8 .8 49 . 0
16 1 .4 .4 49 .4
18 7 2.7 2.7 52 .2
24 21 8.2 8.2 60.4
30 3 1.2 1.2 61. 6
32 2 .8 .8 62 .4
36 17 6.7 6.7 69 . 0
48 9 3.5 3 . 5 72 .5
54 1 .4 .4 72 . 9
60 13 5 .1 5 .1 78 . 0
66 3 1.2 1.2 79.2
72 5 2.0 2 . 0 81.2
76 1 .4 .4 81. 6
80 9 3 .5 3.5 85 .1
86 1 .4 .4 85.5
90 1 .4 .4 85 . 9
120 6 2.4 2.4 88 .2
144 1 .4 .4 88 . 6
156 2 .8 .8 89.4
160 1 .4 .4 89.8
180 7 2.7 2.7 92 . 5
216 1 .4 .4 92 . 9
240 10 3 . 9 3 . 9 96 . 9
276 2 .8 .8 97 . 6
300 4 1.6 1. 6 99.2
360 1 .4 .4 99 . 6
480 1 .4 .4 100 . 0
Total 255 
in months
100 . 0 100 . 0 
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
24 10 3 . 9 3 . 9 3 . 9
48 86 33.7 33 .7 37 . 6
60 6 2.4 2.4 40 . 0
120 100 39.2 39.2 79.2
450 53 20.8 20.8 100 . 0
Total 255 100.0 100.0
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HIFEL prior high severity felony convictions
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No priors 0 207 81.2 81.2
Priors " 1« 48 18.8 18 .8
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
LOFEL prior low severity felony convictions
V
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No priors 0 185 72 .5 72 .5
Priors 1 70 27 .5 27 . 5
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
HIJUV prior high severity juvenile adjudications
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No priors 0 214 83 . 9 83 . 9
Priors 1 41 16 .1 16 .1
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
LOJUV prior low severity juvenile adjudications
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No priors 0 249 97 . 6 97 . 6
Priors 1 6 2.4 2.4
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
MISD prior misdemeanors
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No more than 1 prior 0 209 82 . 0 82 .0
2-3 priors 1 19 7.5 7.5
4+ priors 2 27 10 . 6 10 . 6
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
PRIORREL prior relationship to thei criminal justice :system
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No prior relationship 0 186 72.9 72 . 9
Other/post relationship 1 69 27 .1 27 .1
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
Cum
Percent
81.2 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
72.5 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
83 . 9 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
97 . 6 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
82 . 0 
89.4 
100.0
Cum
Percent
72 . 9 
100 . 0
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SUBCONV subsequent/concurrent convictions
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No
Yes
0
1
194
61
76.1 
23 . 9
76.1 
23 . 9
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
WEAPON presence/type of weapon
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No weapon used
Use of non-firearm weapon
Use of firearm
0
1
2
45
42
168
17 . 6 
16.5 
65 . 9
17 . 6 
16.5 
65 . 9
Total 255 100. 0 100.0
PHATTACK physical attack on victim
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Victim not touched/assaulted 0 39 15 .3 15 .3
Victim touched beyond that 
needed to commit instant 
offense 1 6 2.4 2.4
Victim suffered bodily injury 2 162 63 .5 63 .5
Victim suffered a serious 
impairment or permanent 
disfigurement 3 47 18 .4 18.4
Victim was killed 4 1 .4 .4
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
KIDNAP victim carried away
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No
Yes
0
1
238
17
93 .3 
6.7
93 .3 
6.7
Total 255 100.0 100.0
MULTVICT multiple victims
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No multiple victims 
2 victims 
3+ victims
0
1
2
188
43
24
73 .7 
16 . 9 
9.4
73 .7 
16 . 9 
9.4
Total 255 100.0 100.0
Cum
Percent
76.1 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
17 . 6 
34 .1 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
15.3
17 . 6 
81.2
99 . 6 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
93 .3 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
73 .7 
90 . 6 
100 . 0
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EXPLOIT offender exploitation of victim's vulnerability
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
No 0 185 72 . 5 72 .5
Yes 1 70 27 .5 27 . 5
Total 255 100.0 100 . 0
MOB professional/organized < 
Value Label Value
zrime member 
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No 0 252 98.8 98 .8
Yes 1 3 1.2 1.2
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
OFFROLE offender's role 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Role was minor/peripheral 0 7 2.7 2.7
Acted alone 1 205 80.4 80.4
Active participant in 
multiple offender situation 2 35 13 .7 13 .7
Leader in multiple offender 
situation 3 8 3 .1 3 .1
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
CONTEMP contemporaneous acts 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No more than 1 act 0 244 95.7 95.7
2 acts 1 6 2.4 2.4
3+ acts 2 5 2 . 0 2 . 0
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
Cum
Percent
72 .5 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
98 .8 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
2.7
83 .1
96 . 9
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
95.7 
98 . 0 
100 . 0
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AGE year of birth
Valid Cum
Value Label
RACE race
Value Label
Caucasian 
Non-Caucas inan
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percenl
0 2 .8 .8 .8
17 1 .4 .4 1.2
18 5 2.0 2 . 0 3 .1
19 12 4.7 4.7 7.8
20 13 5.1 5 .1 12 . 9
21 14 5.5 5 . 5 • 18.4
22 13 5 .1 5.1 23 .5
23 17 6.7 6.7 30.2
24 15 5 . 9 5 . 9 36 .1
25 15 5 . 9 5 . 9 42 . 0
26 12 4.7 4.7 46.7
27 15 5 . 9 5 . 9 52 .5
28 10 3.9 3.9 56 . 5
29 12 4.7 4.7 61 .2
30 6 2.4 2.4 63 .5
31 7 2.7 2.7 66.3
32 10 3 . 9 3 . 9 70.2
33 7 2.7 2.7 72 . 9
34 9 3.5 •3 . 5 76.5
35 5 2 . 0 2 . 0 78 .4
36 6 2.4 2.4 80.8
37 5 2 . 0 2 . 0 82 .7
38 4 1. 6 1. 6 84 . 3
39 5 2 . 0 2.0 86 .3
40 2 .8 .8 87 .1
41 1 .4 .4 87 .5
43 2 .8 .8 88 .2
44 1 .4 .4 88 . 6
45 2 .8 .8 89 .4
46 2 .8 .8 90.2
47 1 .4 .4 90 . 6
49 3 1.2 1.2 91.8
50 1 .4 .4 92 .2
52 3 1.2 1.2 93 .3
53 1 .4 .4 93 .7
54 2 .8 .8 94 . 5
56 1 .4 .4 94 . 9
59 1 .4 .4 95.3
60 1 .4 .4 95.7
63 2 .8 .8 96 . 5
70 1 .4 .4 96 . 9
99 8 3 .1 3 .1 100. 0
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
0 118 46 .3 46.3 46.3
1 137 53 .7 53 .7 100.0
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
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SEX gender
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Male 0 227 89 . 0 89 . 0 89 . 0
Female 1 28 11. 0 11. 0 100 . 0
Total
DEPEND number of dependents
255 100 . 0 100.0
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
0 130 51.0 51. 0 51. 0
1 53 20.8 20.8 71.8
2 36 14 .1 14.1 85 . 9
3 17 6.7 6.7 92 . 5
4 14 5.5 5.5 98 . 0
5 1 .4 .4 98.4
6 2 .8 .8 99.2
7 1 .4 .4 99 . 6
9 1 .4 .4 100 . 0
Total
GRADE highest grade completed
255 100 . 0 100 . 0 
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
0 2 .8 .8 .8
1 1 .4 .4 1.2
3 2 .8 .8 2 . 0
4 1 .4 .4 2.4
7 3 1.2 1.2 3 . 5
8 9 3.5 3.5 7 .1
9 27 10.6 10 . 6 17 . 6
10 37 14.5 14 . 5 32 .2
11 42 16.5 16.5 48 . 6
12 110 43 .1 43 .1 91.8
13 6 2.4 2.4 94 .1
14 11 4.3 4.3 98.4
15 3 1.2 1.2 99 . 6
16 1 .4 .4 100 . 0
Total
ASSETS assets-$1500
255 100 . 0 100.0
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
No 0 46 18 . 0 18 . 0 - 18 . 0
Yes 1 209 82 . 0 82 .0 100 . 0
Total 255 100.0 100 . 0
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DRUGS drug use
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No
Yes
0
1
163
92
63 .9 
36.1
63 .9 
36.1
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
ATTORNEY type of attorney
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Public defender 
Privately retained
0
1
204
51
80 . 0 
20.0
80 . 0 
20 . 0
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
PLEA plea
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Guilty plea 
Not guilty plea
0
1
214
41
83 . 9 
16.1
83 .9 
16.1
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
ALC alcohol use
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No
Yes
0
1
148
105
2
58 . 0 
41.2 
.8
58.5
41.5 
Missing
Total 255 100 . 0 100 . 0
WED marital status
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Married
Single
0
1
42
185
28
16.5 
72 .5 
11.0
18 . 5 
81.5 
Missing
Cum
Percent
63 . 9 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
80 . 0 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
83 . 9 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
58 . 5 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
18.5
100.0
Total 255 100.0 100.0
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Appendix B. Frequencies for Robbery Case Variables 
ACTSEN actual sentence in months
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
0 24 6.2 6.2 6.2
2 1 .3 .3 6.5
3 4 1.0 1. 0 7 . 5
6 9 2.3 2.3 9.8
7 2 .5 .5 10 .4
8 2 . 5 . 5 10 . 9
9 4 1. 0 1. 0 11. 9
12 42 10. 9 10 . 9 22 .8
13 2 .5 .5 23 .3
15 2 .5 .5 23 .8
18 23 6 . 0 6 . 0 29.8
21 1 .3 .3 30.1
24 38 9.8 9.8 39 . 9
26 1 .3 .3 40.2
28 1 .3 .3 40.4
30 10 2.6 2 . 6 43 . 0
3 6 38 9.8 9.8 52 .8
40 2 .5 .5 53 .4
42 4 1. 0 1.0 54 .4
48 17 4.4 4.4 58 . 8
54 2 .5 .5 59 .3
60 33 8.5 8.5 67 . 9
66 2 .5 .5 68 .4
72 18 4.7 4.7 73 .1
78 3 .8 .8 73 .8
84 18 4.7 4.7 78.5
90 7 1.8 1.8 80 .3
96 16 4 .1 4 .1 84.5
102 1 .3 .3 84.7
108 1 .3 .3 85 . 0
120 28 7.3 7.3 92 .2
129 1 .3 .3 92 .5
144 4 1. 0 1. 0 93 .5
160 1 .3 .3 93 .8
168 4 1. 0 1.0 94 . 8
180 2 .5 . 5 95.3
240 * 11 2.8 2.8 98.2
244 1 .3 .3 98.4
300 5 1.3 1.3 99.7
480 1 .3 .3 100 . 0
Total 386 100.0 100 . 0
SMAX statutory maximum in months
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
60 12 3 .1 3.1 3 .1
120 10 2 . 6 2 . 6 5.7
180 77 19 . 9 19 . 9 25 . 6
(Life or term of years) 450 287 74.4 74 .4 100 . 0
Total 386 100.0 100.0
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HIFEL prior high severity felony convictions
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No priors 
Priors
0
1
290
96
75 .1 
24 . 9
75 .1 
24 . 9
Total 386 100 . 0 100 .0
LOFEL prior low severity felony convictions
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No priors 
Priors
0
1
256
130
66.3 
33 .7
66.3 
33 .7
Total 386 100 . 0 100 .0
HIJUV prior high severity juvenile adjudications
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No priors 
Priors
0
1
302
84
78.2
21.8
78.2
21.8
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
LOJUV prior low severity juvenile adjudications
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No priors 
Priors
0
1
369
17
95 . 6 
4.4
95 . 6 
4.4
Total 386 100.0 100.0
MISD prior mis demeano r s
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No more than 1 prior 
2-3 priors 
4+ priors
0
1
2
298
41
47
77 .2 
10 . 6 
12 .2
77 .2 
10 . 6 
12 .2
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
PRIORREL prior relationship to the! criminal justice system
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No prior relationship 0 
Other/post relationship 1
294
92
76.2 
23 .8
76.2 
23 .8
Cum
Percent
75 .1 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
66.3 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
78.2 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
95 . 6 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
77.2 
87 .8 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
76.2 
100 . 0
Total 386 100.0 100.0
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SUBCONV subsequent/concurrent convictions
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No
Yes
0
1
253
133
65.5
34.5
65.5
34.5
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
WEAPON presence/type of weapon
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No weapon used
Use of non-firearm weapon
Use of firearm
0
1
2
43
144
199
11.1 
37 .3 
51. 6
11.1 
37 .3 
51. 6
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
PHATTACK physical attack of victim
Value Label
•
Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Victim not touched/assaulted 0 248 64 .2 64 .2
Victim touched beyond that 
needed to commit instant 
offense 1 52 13 . 5 13 .5
Victim suffered bodily injury 2
ft
80 20.7 20.7
Victim suffered a serious 
impairment or permanent 
disfigurement 3 4 1.0 1.0
Victim was killed 4 2 . 5 .5
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
KIDNAP victim carried away
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No
Yes
0
1
352
34
91.2
8.8
91.2
8.8
Total 386 100 . 0 100 .0
MULTVICT multiple victims
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No multiple victims 
2 victims 
3+ victims
0
1
2
259
82
45
67 .1 
21.2 
11.7
67 .1 
21.2 
11.7
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
. Cum 
Percent
65 . 5 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
11.1
48 .4 
100. 0
Cum
Percent
64 .2
77 .7 
98.4
99 .5 
100.0
Cum
Percent
91.2 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
67 .1 
88.3 
100. 0
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EXPLOIT offender exploitation of victim's vulnerability
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No 0 301 78 . 0 78 . 0
Yes 1 85 22 . 0 22 . 0
Total 386 100. 0 100 . 0
MOB professional/organized ( 
Value Label Value
orime member 
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No 0 363 94 . 0 94.0
Yes 1 23 6 . 0 6.0
Total 386 100.0 100.0
OFFROLE offender's role 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Role was minor/peripheral 0 11 2 . 8 2.8
Acted alone 1 160 41.5 41.5
Active participant in 
multiple offender situation 2 187 48 .4 48.4
Leader in multiple offender 
situation 3 28 7.3 7.3
Total 386 100 . 0 100.0
CONTEMP contemporaneous acts 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
No more than 1 act 0 330 85.5 85.5
2 acts 1 23 6.0 6 . 0
3+ acts 2 33 8.5 8.5
Total 386 100.0 100.0
Cum
Percent
78.0 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
94 . 0 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
2.8
44.3
92 .7
100.0
Cum
Percent
85.5
91.5 
100 . 0
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AGE year of birth
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
17 5 1.3 1.3
18 28 7.3 7.3
19 37 9 . 6 9 . 6
20 40 10.4 10 .4
21 33 8.5 8.5
22 31 8 . 0 8 . 0
23 20 5.2 5.2
24 20 5.2 5.2
25 21 5.4 5.4
26 11 2.8 2.8
27 14 3 . 6 3 . 6
28 8 2.1 2.1
29 12 3.1 3 .1
30 9 2.3 2.3
31 14 3 . 6 3 . 6
32 10 2 . 6 2 . 6
33 5 1.3 1.3
34 5 1.3 1.3
35 9 2.3 2.3
36 4 1.0 1. 0
37 1 .3 .3
38 6 1.6 1. 6
39 4 1. 0 1. 0
40 4 1. 0 1. 0
41 2 .5 .5
42 1 .3 .3
43 1 .3 .3
45 3 .8 .8
46 1 .3 .3
47 2 .5 .5
52 1 .3 .3
55 1 .3 .3
87 1 .3 .3
• 22 5.7 Missing
RACE race
Total 386 100 . 0 100.0
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
Caucasian 0 149 38.6 38 . 6
Non-Caucasian 1 237 61.4 61.4
SEX gender
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0 
Valid
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent
Male 0 369 95.6 95 . 6
Female 1 17 4.4 4.4
Total 386 100 . 0
•
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
1.3 
8 . 5 
18.1 
28.5 
37 . 0 
45 .1 
50 .3 
55 .4 
60 . 9
63
67
69
72
74
78
81
82
83
86 . 0 
87 . 0
87
88
89
90
91 
91.7 
92.0
92 .7
93 . 0 
93 .5
93 .8
94 . 0 
94 .3
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
38.6
100.0
Cum
Percent
95 . 6 
100 . 0
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DEPEND number of dependents
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
0 239 61. 9 61.9 61. 9
1 71 18 .4 18 .4 80.3
2 39 10 .1 10 .1 90.4
3 19 4.9 4 . 9 95.3
4 6 1.6 1.6 96 . 9
5 4 1. 0 1. 0 97 *9
6 1 .3 .3 98.2
• 7 1.8 Missing 100 . 0
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
GRADE highest grade completed
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 1 .3 .3 .3
4 1 .3 .3 . 5
6 1 .3 .3 .8
7 6 1.6 1.6 2.3
8 11 2.8 2.8 5.2
9 37 9 . 6 9 . 6 14 .8
10 61 15.8 15 .8 30 . 6
11 67 17 .4 17 .4 47 . 9
12 142 36.8 36.8 84 .7
13 20 5.2 5.2 89 . 9
14 13 3.4 3 .4 93 .3
16 1 .3 .3 93 .5
25 6.5 Missing 100 . 0
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
ASSETS! hssets-$1500
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
No 0 365 94 . 6 94 . 6 94 . 6
Yes 1 21 5.4 5.4 100 . 0
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
DRUGS drug use
Valid Cum
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
No 0 178 46.1 46 .1 46.1
Yes 1 201 52 .1 52 .1 98.2
• 7 1.8 Missing 100 . 0
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
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ATTORNEY type of attorney
Value Label
Public defender 
Privately retained
PLEA plea
Value Label
Guilty plea 
Not guilty plea
ALC alcohol use
Value Label
No
Yes
WED marital status
%
Value Label
Married
Single
Valid
Value Frequency Percent Percent
0 337 87 .3 87 .3
1 49 12 .7 12 .7
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
0 339 87 . 8 87 .8
1 47 12 .2 12 .2
Total 386 100 . 0 100 .0
Value Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
0 248 64 .2 65.4
1 131 33 . 9 34 . 6
• 7 1.8 Missing
Total 386 100 . 0 100 . 0
* Valid
Value Frequency Percent Percent
0 32 8.3 9 .1
1 318 82 .4 90 . 9
• 36 9.3 Missing
Total 386 100.0 100.0
Cum
Percent
87 .3 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
87 . 8 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
65 .4 
100 . 0
Cum
Percent
9 .1 
100 . 0
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